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THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY
ACT OF 1935
In the tangle caused by increased federal regulation of American indus-
try, the overall scope of such regulation is often forgotten in examining the
minutia of a particular area of concentration. As new regulatory schemes are
added to the old, there is a tendency to consider the old as only of historical
importance. The regulatory teeth of the older statute, which may still have
a sharp bite, are neglected. One statute which has been treated in this
cavalier fashion is the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. 1 Many
consider the act of only academic interest since the regulatory pattein of the
act makes the Securities and Exchange Commission's functions self-liquidat-
ing.2 However, the belief that the process of elimination of 1935-vintage
holding companies has been completed is erroneous. True, there are fewer
cases now brought by the SEC to curb the size of holding companies than
there were in the years immediately following passage of the act, but the act
is still a powerful weapon for federal regulation of the utilities industry.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES
In order to understand the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
particularly section 11(b) (I),3 it is necessary to examine the historical
pattern of utility holding companies in the United States and the economic
chaos that resulted from their activities culminating in the passage of the act
to control and regulate their conduct.
After the development of electrical power as a source of cheap and effi-
cient light and heat, private companies were formed to distribute this energy
to the public. During the post-World War I period and the nineteen-twenties,
the utilities industry, like many others, grew tremendously, both physically
and in economic importance. The pyramid principle of the holding company
was applied to the electric and gas utilities industry. A holding company
would control operating , companies by buying enough stock in each one to
control its management. Thus, one company, through stock control, would
manage many operating companies scattered throughout the country. The
pyramid effect was further heightened when the second level was expanded to
a third or fourth degree. The top level of the holding company would control
the management of the lower levels by stock ownership, and thus control the
management of the operating companies.
The result was that while all the holding companies' securities holdings
in the operating companies constituted a very small fraction of the total inde-
pendent public investment in them," this small amount was sufficient to direct
their development, growth, and economic policies. Several men created fan-
1
 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
	 79a (1964).
2 Loss, Securities Regulation 137 (1961).
3 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (1) (1964).
4
 79 Cong. Rec. 8926 (1935) (radio speech of Senator Wheeler, June 9, 1935) ;




tastic fortunes manipulating utility stock in this fashion while playing the
piper to the general investing public, Samuel Insull of Chicago, known as the
"uncrowned king of Illinois," 5 alone controlled four of these large holding
combines.° The "crown prince of corporate jazz was Howard C. Hopson of
the Associated Gas and Electric Company system. He succeeded and exceeded
. . Insull in holding company legerdemain."' Some of the manipulative
devices utilized by these financeers were: fictitious stock subscriptions;
inflated appraisal of operating companies' properties leading to write-ups (or
stock watering) of assets; inflation of the holding company's income state-
ments by writing the earnings and surplus of the subsidiaries on the holding
company books, thus making the subsidiaries' capital the holding company's
earnings; and improvident purchase of operating companies by paying exces-
sive prices for these properties—a price which is used on the balance sheet to
reduce income taxes. 5 These sly practices led Will Rogers to define a holding
company as "something where you hand an accomplice the goods while the
policeman searches you."5
For the general mass of unsophisticated investors during the 1920's, the
public utility companies were considered blue chip securities and, because the
investor could own a portion of many utilities with one relatively small invest-
ment, the public utility holding company represented the most gilt-edged of
these blue-chips. 1° By 1932 thirteen large holding company groups controlled
over seventy-five per cent of the operating utility industry, and three of these
groups alone controlled forty per cent of the entire operating industry." But
eventually this delicate house of cards had to collapse of its own weight, and
the Great Depression was the catalyst which marked the economic collapse of
the big utility holding companies. In 1929 common stocks of the twenty-five
largest holding companies had a market value of $16,787,563,147—"an
amount practically equal to the public debt of the United States at that
time."12 Comparison of the market value of some of these stocks at the height
of the boom in 1929 with their value in early 1933 demonstrates the degree of
5 Ritchie, Integration of Public Utility Holding Companies 1 (1954).
8 Id. at 2. They were Middle West Utilities Co., Midland United Co., People's Gas,
Light and Coke Co., and Commonwealth Edison Co.
7 Id. at 3.
8 See 79 Cong. Rec. 10321 (1935). See generally 79 Cong. Rec. 10317-18 (1935)
(FTC report to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, April 9,
1935).
° Quoted by Senator Wheeler in an address made April 2, 1935. 79 'Cong. Rec. 4902
(1935).
1 ° This is evidenced by the innumerable times the proponents and opponents, when
discussing the Public Utility Act, referred to the "widows and orphans" caught in the
collapse of the utility stock market boom. See, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 8926 (1935) (remarks
of Senator Wheeler). Of course, both sides used these same "widows and orphans" to
support their varying pOsitions, but it is obvious the late "parents and husbands" con-
sidered them prudent investments when they invested in these stocks.
11 The three groups were Electric Bond and Share, United Corporation and Insull's
companies. 79 Cong. Rec., 4902 (1935); H.R. Rep. No. 1318, supra note 4, at 49; Report
of the National Power Policy Committee on Public Utility Holding Companies, S. Rep.
No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1935).
12 79 Cong. Rec. 10319 (1935) (remarks of Representative Rayburn).
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their economic collapse. For example, ten shares of Middle West Utilities
worth $500 in 1929 were valued at $1.25 in 1933.' 3
The wounded public utility investor turned to the federal government
for help, and so too did the injured operating companies. Aside from the
economic abuses perpetuated by these holding companies, there were weak-
nesses apparent in their practical day-to-day organization. The "operating
properties of the holding companies were not grouped in economically nor
geographically contiguous units ... in defiance of all principles of engineering
efficiency.MAI Management directions came from home offices which were often
located great distances from the problems of the local operating company."
The holding company systems also owned or operated subsidiaries in specula-
tive, non-utility enterprises."
II. THE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE
On March 12, 1933, less than two weeks after his inauguration, President
Roosevelt, in a message to Congress, expressed his concern over the public
utilities situation and outlined what measures of regulation he envisaged:
Except where it is absolutely necessary to the continued functioning
of a geographically integrated operating utility system, the utility
holding company with its present powers must go. If we could re-
make our financial history in the light of experience, certainly we
would have none of this holding company business. It is a device
which does not belong to our American traditions of law and busi-
ness. . . . And it offers too well demonstrated . temptation to, and
facility for, abuse to be tolerated as a recognized business institu-
tion. That temptation and that facility are inherent in its very
nature. It is a corporate invention which can give a few corporate
insiders unwarranted and intolerable powers over other people's
money. In its destruction of local control and its substitution of
absentee management, it has built up in the public-utility field what
has just been called a system of private socialism which is inimical
to the welfare of a free people.
I am against private socialism of concentrated private power as
thoroughly as I am against governmental socialism. The one is
equally as dangerous as the other: and destruction of private social-
ism is utterly essential to avoid governmental socialism."
The President's firm committal to regulation of the public utility holding
company systems was the prelude to an impassioned and tempestuous con-
13
 Other examples of the sharp decline in market prices are: ten shares of American
Gas and Electric Company, valued at $2,038.75 in 1929, dropped in value to $210 in 1933;
ten shares of Commonwealth and Southern Company, valued at $320 in 1929, were worth
only $18.75 in 1933; ten shares of Stone and Webster common stock, worth $1,133.75
in 1929, were valued at $62.50 in 1933. 79 Cong. Rec. 10319 (1935).
14 Ritchie, op. cit. supra note 5, at 13.
15
 Id. at 14.
I3 Ibid.
17 Message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress, March 12, 1935, H.R.
Rep. No. 1318, supra note 4, at 1-3 (1935).
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gressional debate on the proposed legislative action. "The object ... of the
bill was to reform scattered and loosely knit [public utility holding company
systems] into unified operations. . . ." 15 Because the electrical and gas utility
industries are to an extent natural monopolies, the statute was envisaged as a
peculiar sort of antimonopoly law in that it was designed to restore the effec-
tiveness of state and federal regulation rather than the effectiveness of com-
petition in a free market. To accomplish this objective, Congress stated that
"the national public interest, the interest of investors . . . and the interests of
consumers .. . may be adversely affected"1° by (1) lack of information,
(2) restraint on the subsidiaries' independent bargaining power, (3) obstruc-
tion of state regulation of the subsidiaries by the actions of the holding com-
pany, (4) uneconomical management of the holding company because of its
excessive growth, and (5) lack of efficiency, economy and adequate service
caused by the holding companies, for whatever reason." Section 1 (c) of the
act declared that when these abuses injure consumers, investors or the public,
the policy of the act was to "be interpreted, to meet the problems and elimi-
nate the evil ... [which) burden interstate commerce . . . [to be effectuated
by compelling] the simplification of public-utility holding company systems,
and to provide ... for the elimination of [such] companies. . . )721
A holding company is defined as any company which controls ten per
cent of the voting stock of a public utility company 22 or any person who exer-
cises such a controlling interest in a holding company or utility company as
to necessitate his being brought under the act. 23 But the heart of the act lay in
section 11 which made it the express duty of the SEC to carry out the
mandate to simplify and eliminate uneconomical holding companies. 24 This
section, popularly called the "death sentence" clause, 25 was the focal point
of high emotion and bitter controversy 26
 during the months in which the bill
18 Ritchie, op. cit. supra note 5, at 17, citing Ramsey, Pyramids of Power 281-82
(1937).
19 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S. C.	 79a(b)	 (1964).
20 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S .C. § 79a(b)(1)-(5)	 (1964).
21 49 Stat. 804 (1935), 15 U.S .C. § 79a(c)	 (1964).
22 49 Stat. 806 (1935), 15 U.S .C. § 79b(a)(7)(A)	 (1964).
23 49 Stat. 806 (1935), 15 U.S .C. § 79b(a) (7) (B) (1964). "Public-utility company"
is defined as an electric or gas utility company. 49 Stat. 806 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (5)
(1964).
24 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1964),
25 S. Rep. No. 621, supra note 11, at 11.
2° Tempers and language ran very high. Congressman Rankin of Mississippi, speaking
about the compromise act, stated that ". . . it isn't extreme enough. I want to wring
the hands of the racketeers from the throats of the American people who pay these
exorbitant burdens for the electric light. . . ." 79 Cong. Rec. 14623 (1935). Senator
Norris (speaking on holding companies), ". . . [they] were conceived in sin, . , . man-
aged in total disregard of the public good. . They are parasites upon our civiliza-
tion. . . ." 79 Cong. Rec. 10848 (1935) ; Congressman Cooper (opponent of the bill),
". • • the provisions of the Wheeler bill . . . will mean nationalization of the electric
utility industry. . . [I] t does not mean regulation, but it does mean destruction. . ."
79 Cong. Rec. 10328 (1935). One writer has characterized the legislative battle as ". . a
bitter struggle on the 'Hill' against as strong a lobby as ever moved into Washington,
D.C." Douglas, Foreword to Symposium on the Securities and Exchange Commission,
28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1959).
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was discussed by the House and Senate. The bill was introduced in the House
February 6, 1935, by Sam Rayburn," but the Senate-House Conference
Report was not adopted by those bodies until August 24, 1935. 28 As finally
enacted, the section shows signs of the struggle. Under the House bill," the
Commission was directed to require each holding company system to operate
as one integrated public utility holding system." The burden of proof was
on the Coriamission; the test they were to apply was a nebulous standard of
retention of properties if it was consistent with 'the public interest." The
Senate bill 32
 adhered more closely to the recommendations of the President
and the National Power Policy Committee 83
 Section 11(a) of the Senate bill
made it the Commission's duty to examine the corporate structure of each of
the holding company systems in order to determine what complexities of
corporate structure could be removed and whether these properties were
geographically and economically integrated." Section 11(b) empowered the
Commission to issue a divestment order, enforceable in the federal courts,
requiring a holding company or a subsidiary to divest itself of any property
which was not geographically or economically an integrated portion of a
public utility system." The second part of this section gave the Commission
power to require each holding company or its subsidiary to reorganize or
dissolve whenever the Commission found that the continued existence of the
corporate structure threatened the company's geographical or economic inte-
gration."
The present act represents a compromise between the Senate's strong
anti-holding company legislation and the House's milder, less precise tone.
27
 79 Cong. Rec. 1624 (1935).
28 79 Cong. Rec. 14473, 14626 (1935).
28 Which had a rough haul too. The original bill was replaced by a substitute bill in
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and, as amended, was re-
ported favorably. H.R. Rep. No. 1318, supra note 4. The strong minority views of the
committee members were presented by Congressman E. C. Eicher. He felt the bill as
reported to the House (H.R. 5423) was irreconcilably inconsistent with the Senate bill
(S. 2796). He felt section 11 had been "thoroughly emasculated" and the form of the
bill as reported out included a "constitutionally dangerous, indefinite delegation of power
to a regulatory commission." H.R. Rep. No. 1318, supra note 4, at 45. This minority
position of the House Committee was prophetic of the majority of the House and Senate
members' views at a later stage of the legislative struggle.
38
 Gas and electric systems were eventually defined separately in the act. In genera!,
an integrated utility must be confined to one geographical area and be capable of
economical operation and physical interconnection. 49 Stat., 810 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79b(a) (29)(A), (B) (1964).
31 H.R. Rep. No. 1318, supra note 4; H.R. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935). In view of the Supreme Court decision on the National Recovery Act, this was
considered by many to be an unconstitutional standard. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
82 It, too, had difficulties. The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce so
changed the original bill (S. 1725) that a new bill was introduced (S. 2796). See S. Rep.
No. 621, supra note 11, at 4.
83
 Id. at 4, 60.
84
 Id. at 32. The subsection as enacted contained essentially the same words. 49 Stat.
820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(a) (1964).
85
 S. Rep. No. 621, supra note 11, at 32.
88
 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
	 79k(a), (b) (1964).
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A vocal minority in each chamber objected to revisions in the act which were
passed.37 The Senate bill was diluted by adding to section 11(b) (1) the
"ABC" clauses which permit the retention of more than one integrated
public utility system if the Commission finds that:
(A) Each of such additional systems cannot be operated as an
independent system without the loss of substantial economies which
can be secured by the retention of control by such holding company
of such system;
(B) All of such additional systems are located in one State, or in
adjoining States, or in a contiguous foreign country; and
(C) The continued combination of such systems under the control
of such holding company is not so large (considering the state of
the art and the area or region affected) as to impair the advantages
of localized management, efficient operation, or the effectiveness of
regulation."
The "public interest" standard of the House bill, which the Chairman of the
SEC had publicly castigated," was replaced by a more precise standard:
that the Commission limit the operations of a holding company to "such
other businesses as are reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or
appropriate to the operations of such integrated public-utility system. . .
Though there was much bitterness in both the Senate and the House over
the compromise bil1, 41 the legislation was eventually passed, and the respon-
sibility for controlling the utility holding companies was handed to the SEC.
III. LITIGATION UNDER SECTION 1 1 (b)(1): New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC
A typical example of the struggles the SEC must overcome in order to
enforce the congressional mandate is shown by the litigational background
of New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC. 42 In 1940 the Commission instituted a
proceeding under section 11(b) (2) of the act to simplify the corporate
structure" of the International Hydro-Electric System, a large public utility
holding company, which included six subholding companies. The Commission
found that no economic justification for the continued existence of the hold-
ing company existed," and worked out a plan whereby one of the subholding
companies was terminated and, Minerva-like, the New England Electric
System (NEES) sprang from the assets of the other five subholding corn-
37 For example, Congressman Huddleston, of the House Conference Committee,
reported back to Congress that although he had signed the conference report which sent
the compromise bill out to the two houses because he was "constrained by the instruc-
tions given by the House," he had "no intention whatever of voting for" the conference
bill. 79 Cong. Rec. 14623 (1935).
88 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1)(A), (B), (C) (1964).
89 Letter of Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission: "I cannot be too vehement • . . this section . . . is most unfortunate." 79
Cong. Rec. 10838 (1935).
49 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (1) (1964).
41 See, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 14470 (1935) (remarks of Senator Norris).
42 New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC, 346 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1965).
43 49 Stat. 821 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (2) (1935).
44 See Protective Comm. v. SEC, 184 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1950).
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panies." Interestingly, some of the stockholders affected by this proposal
tried to have the Commission settle the integration and retention-of-properties
issues of section 11(b) (1) before its plan to create NEES could be enforced.
But the court of appeals held that it was not necessary for the Commission
to proceed under section 11(b) (1) before proceeding under section 11(b) (2),
because consummation of the simplification plan would in no way prejudice
subsequent proceedings under section 11(b)(1). 40
The NEES holding company controls seven electric utility subsidiaries
(which serve 824,000 retail customers in New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island and Connecticut) and eight gas utility companies (which serve
237,000 retail customers in Massachusetts only) 9 7
 About seventy-five per
cent of the gas franchises are also part of the franchise area served by NEES'
electric operating subsidiaries, and seventy-eight per cent of its gas customers
are also served by the electric companies." In August 1957, the SEC insti-
tuted proceedings under section 11(b)(1) to determine the extent to which
NEES could lawfully retain control over its electric and gas properties, since
it had been stated consistently that a "single integrated system" may not
include a combination of both an integrated electric system and integrated
gas properties." The Commission found, initially, that NEES' electric utility
assets comprised an integrated electric utility system, meeting the standards
of section 2(a) (29)(A) of the act," and the company elected to retain these
assets as its "principal system."" The Commission then sought to determine
whether the gas utilities" could be retained as an "additional" integrated
utility system under section 11(b) (1). The retention of "additional systems"
is permitted by the "ABC" clauses of section 11(b)(1)," and the burden
of proof is placed on the holding company to show that its systems come
within the section's exceptions." Since these requirements are cumulative,
all must be fulfilled before the retention of an additional system may be
approved." Furthermore, the Commission has also observed that the ABC
clauses envisage additional systems which are junior in importance to the
45 See Lahti v. New England Power Ass'n, 160 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1947).
40 Id. at 850. In reality, the stockholders acquired, among other assets, the liability
of a later suit by the Commission which could eliminate all their assets.
47 Holding Company Act Release No. 15035, at 1256-57 (March 19, 1964).
48 Id. at 1257.
49 Philadelphia Co., 28 S.E.C. 35 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 17 S.E.C. 494 (1944); United Gas Improvement Co.,
9 S.E.C. 7 (1941).
50 New England Elec. Sys., 38 S.E.C. 193 (1958).
51
 This is the short name for the nucleus of properties which constitute the "single
integrated public utility system" of § 11(b) (1). See Engineers Pub. Serv. Co., 12 S.E.C.
41 (1942). The term was used by Congress before the act became law, although it doesn't
appear by that name in the act. H.R. Rep. No. 1903, supra note 31, at 71.
52 Which all the parties agreed to consider as an "integrated gas utility system,"
49 Stat. 810 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(29)(B) (1964); Holding Company Act Release
No. 15035, supra note 47, at 1256.
58
 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C.
	
79k(b)(1)(B) (1964).
54 United Gas Improvement Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 1010, 1021 (3d Cir. 1943).
55 Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 49; North American Co. v. SEC, 133 F.2d
148, 152 (2d Cir. 1943), aff'd on constitutional issues, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
722
STUDENT COMMENTS
principal system of the holding company, and thus are dependent upon the
continuation of joint control with the single system."
In New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC," NEES brought a petition to review
and set aside an SEC divestment order entered pursuant to regulations
promulgated under section 11(b) (1). The SEC order had directed the hold-
ing company to divest itself of its eight gas subsidiaries. The Commission
found that the holding company (NEES) had failed to meet its burden of
showing that the gas utilities could not be operated as an independent system
without the loss of substantial economies unless continued control was re-
tained by the holding company, thus bringing itself within clause (A), the
exception to section 11(b) (1). NEES had attempted to prove that the gas
utility properties came within the exception by producing expert evidence
tending to . show that administrative losses, personnel losses, and intensive
local competition satisfied the standards required by the Commission to prove
loss of substantial economies. The court of appeals, setting aside the Com-
mission's order and remanding the case for further action, held that the
Commission's standard for the test of substantial economies, used in con-
sidering whether a public utility comes within the exceptions to section
11(b) (1) (A), is incorrect. The court ruled that the Commission must look
to the entire act in determining its policy, and not merely a single section,
and, accordingly, in deciding whether NEES has sustained its burden of
proof, the Commission must make specific findings as to lessened competition,
and must weigh more carefully the expert evidence presented to it.
In this case the issues revolved solely around clause (A), since NEES
met the requirements of clauses (B) and (C).58 Thus NEES bore the burden
of affirmatively proving that operation of the gas utilities as independent
systems would cause the loss of "substantial economies." 59 The Commission
found that, "on the basis . . . of the entire record .. . [NEES] has [not]
met their burden of showing that the test of clause (A) for the retention of
the gas properties under the control of NEES is satisfied." 5° The court took
issue with that finding, particularly with reference to the Commission's test
for weighing whether the standards of the clause (A) exception had been
met. 6 '
To understand the differences between the court and the Commission,
it is necessary to examine both the judicial and administrative interpretations
of clause (A). An additional system must qualify under all of the ABC
clauses in order to be retained, and the simplest way to dispose of these
questions has been by application of the comparatively simple geographical
56
 See Cities Service Co., 15 S.E.C. 962 (1944).
57
 New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC, supra note 42.
58 "Since all the NEES gas subsidiaries are located within Massachusetts, the stan-
dard of Clause B is met." Holding Company Act Release No. 15035, supra note 47, at
1260. The Commission affirmed the hearing examiner's finding that the size of the com-
bined gas and electric operations is not so large as to raise any substantial question under
the standards of clause C with respect to the advantages of localized management,
efficient operation, and the effectiveness of regulation. Id. at 1260-61.
58
 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. 	 79k(b) (1)(A) (1964).
00
 Holding Company Act Release No. 15035, supra note 47, at 1279.
61 New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC, supra note 42.
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limitation test of clause (B)." The North American Co. case" was the first
situation in which the SEC laid down definitive rules on the interpretation
to be given clause (A). The first Commission ruling was based on the concept
that clause (A)'s "substantial economies" refers to economies which may be
secured by the systems themselves, rather than to economies which may be
secured by the holding company." The second ruling is "that 'substantial
economies' means important economies and not merely something more than
nominal."" The next case to deal with the problems of clause (A) was
Engineers Pub. Serv. Co." In holding, as it had in North American, that
the standard of clause (A) had not been met, the Commission stated:
. . . [S]ince this requirement . . . is an exception to a clearly ex-
pressed general policy, it must be strictly construed. . . . [W]e
must require clear and convincing evidence of a loss of economies
which would seriously impair the effective operations of the systems
involved in order to permit the retention of an additional system."
On appeal, the majority of the Second Circuit upheld the Commission's
ruling." They referred to the "important economies" test of North American,
stating, "the required importance must relate to the healthful continuing
business and service of the freed utility."" Later the Commission declared,
"Congress intended . . . that the loss, anticipated for all systems outweigh
the benefits of independence. . . ."" Again, in Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, the
Commission stated that, in their opinion, "economies are not 'substantial'
unless their loss 'would cause a serious economic impairment of the system
such as to render it incapable of independent economical operation.' "71
 But
in Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. SEC, 72 the court of appeals (examining
Engineers and Philadelphia) read this last statement and denied that sub-
stantial economies must be so construed: "[T]he formula proposed by the
Commission is not one that is to be inflexibly used in the application of '
clause A of the saving section."" The court criticised the Commission's
interpretation of "substantial economies" because it believed the language
on its face was so clear that it precluded reference to the legislative history."
It then held that the Commission must consider the economies to be lost by
the holding company as well," although such considerations are contrary
62
 See comment, 59 Yale L.J. 1088, 1103-04 (1950).
68 11 S.E.C. 194 (1942).
64 H.R. Rep. No. 1903, supra note 31, at 71.
65
 North American Co. v. SEC, supra note 55, at 152.
66 12 S.E.C. 41 (1942).
67
 Id. at 60-61.
68
 Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, 138 F.2d 936 (D.C.. Cir. 1943).
69 Id. at 944.
1' Cities Service Power & Light Co., 14 S.E.C. 28, 47 (1943).
71 See Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, supra note 49, at 725.
72
 235 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1956), vacated as moot on jurisdictional grounds, 353
U.S. 368 (1957).
73
 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. SEC, supra note 72, at 173.
74 Id. at 172.
76
 Id. at 173.
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to one of the first rulings laid down by the Commission," and to judicial
precedent. 77
The court in the NEES case found the standard applied by the Com-
mission in the hearings below to be one voiced in the Middle South Util. 78
case: divestment of the additional properties will not be ordered unless it is
shown that such orders will cause the serious economic impairment of the
systems and (the court supplied this meaning") "the gas properties could not
operate effectively and efficiently under separate ownership."'" The court
questioned the interpretation "that a loss is not 'substantial' unless it would
render impossible 'economical or efficient operation,' "81 and discounted the
weight the Commission should give to the oft-quoted remarks of Senator
Wheeler that
. . . the furthest concession [the Senate conferees] could make
would be to permit the Commission to allow a holding company to
control more than one integrated system if the additional systems
were . .. so small that they were incapable of independent econom-
ical operation . . . 82
because they were made after the Senate vote on the act. But Senator
Wheeler, as the sponsor of the Senate bill and the Chairman of the Senate
conferees, was speaking prior to the adoption by the Senate of the conference
report88 and thus prior to the final vote. These remarks have been widely
quoted as indicative of the congressional interpretation of clause (A). 84
The court states that retention where there was "real economic need""
is to be given a general meaning: "a real economic need to avoid any truly
sizable financial loss notwithstanding the utility's ability to absorb it and
remain efficient in some absolute sense." 86 (Emphasis added.) This is in
contrast to the more stringent meaning the Commission gives the same lan-
guage: "real economic need to prevent a loss that would preclude efficient
or effective operation."87 The court supports its opinion by a very careful
examination of the language of the various sections of the act. It rejects the
Commission's position that the phrase "substantial economies" in clause (A)
"is fundamentally different from" 88 the "substantial economies" effectuated
76 See p. 723 supra.
77 "Not even the wisdom of judicial notice is necessary to know that the Act was
not passed to protect the holding company systems. It was the public interest and the
interest of investors and consumers" that was to be protected. Matter of United Corp.,
232 F.2d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 1956).
78 35 S.E.C. I (1953).
70 New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC, supra note 42, at 402,
80
 Ibid.
81 Id. at 403.
82 79 Cong. Rec. 14479 (1935).
83 79 Cong. Rec. 14626 (1935).
84 See Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, supra note 68.
85




88 Id. at 405.
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by section 2(a) (29) (B) 59
 because such a view "is opposed to the common
principle that the same words in different portions of an act are presumed
to have the same meaning"90
 unless it is affirmatively proved to be otherwise.
The court also found
the Commission's interpretation of clause A opposed to the initial
statement of the purposes of the Act . . . the tenor of which was
that holding companies had been found uneconomical to investors
and to the public. . .. [S]ystems which do not offend in this re-
spect . . . should be continued instead of broken up. . . ."
This argument, however, can be criticised in two respects: (1) Inter-
pretation of congressional intent and (2) the function of administrative law.
Congress intended to break up holding companies because their size was a
primary causal factor in perpetration of the abuses. "The very essence of a
commonsense scheme of public regulation is, therefore, that the corporations
to be regulated should not be permitted to reach a size and power and a
complication where a Federal regulatory body can't be a match for them!" 9z
This congressional policy is effectuated by a regulatory commission: if the
Commission determines that a holding company system "offends" in respect
of "economies" to the public and investors, it is not sufficient for the court
to declare that their standard is wrong because the system doesn't "offend
in this respect."93
Whether economy is achieved by centralized control is always a
doubtful question and one peculiarly fitted for decision by an admin-
istrative agency staffed by experts. On such an issue a court cannot
review or reweigh the evidence."
The court also questioned the Commission's findings on the evidence
presented. NEES submitted a study made by Ebasco Services, Inc., man-
agement consultants with extensive experience in the utilities field," which
showed that severance' would bring an increase in operating costs of $1,098,-
00088 to the severed utilities. The Commission, however, questioned $415,600
of this figure—the increase in cost attributable to customer accounting—be-
cause the Ebasco estimate was not based on managing the gas utilities as one
combined system after severance, whereas the comparison figures—the costs
of the system as it is now managed—were so based. NEES did not show
why this combined system, or at least combined billing procedures, should
not be continued." But the Commission concluded that, even accepting the
'Ebasco figure, the over-all loss was not so substantial
89
 49 Stat. 810 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(29)(11) (1964).
00
 New England Elec. Sys., supra note 42, at 405.
91 Id. at 405. The court supports its contention by citing Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, supra note 72, a case whose precedent value is debatable. See pp. 724-25 supra.
92
 79 Cong. Rec. 8926 (1935) (speech by Senator Wheeler, June 9, 1935).
93
 New England Elec. Sys., supra note 42, at 405.
04
 North American Co. v. SEC, supra note 55, at 152, citing Morgan Stanley &
Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1942).
05 See In re Pub. Serv. Carp., 211 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1954).
99
 Holding Company Act Release No. 15035, supra note 47, at 1263-64.
07
 Id. at 1266.
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. as to warrant retention of the gas properties. . . . Although
the amount is larger than the amounts involved in prior severance
cases, . . . the test of substantiality of the estimated loss is not
[measured] in absolute terms but rather in relation to total reve-
nues, expense and income."'
The ratios of the estimated loss of economies (operating revenues, revenue
deductions, gross income and net income) were "lower, or not significantly
higher, than corresponding ratios [for] gas systems"" where divestment
had been ordered by the Commission.
Some of the factors the Commission examines when weighing the issue
of substantial economies have been the size of the subsidiaries relative to
their ability to have their own financial experts, their capability of inde-
pendent financing methods, the importance of staff services supplied by the
holding company1°° and the increased expenditures to provide customer
services, accounting, promotion and billing. 1 °' On the other hand, the Com-
mission does not consider the "economies" from tax savings resulting from
the joint operation of the companies, since such savings have no relation to
operational factors and are dependent only upon the accidents of ownership
and the state of tax legislation at any given time 1 02 The claimed economies
that would be lost by the severance of the gas utilities are (1) actual expenses
now allocated to the gas properties which would have to be paid by the
electrical properties after the separation of the two companies (economies
caused by the use of joint personnel and property), and (2) increased cost
of operations of the gas properties as independent businesses. 1 °2 The Com-
mission has also emphasized its theory of intangible benefits when considering
a holding company's retention of an integrated gas utility system in addition
to a principal electric utility system. "The benefits of terminating widespread
control, subtle and apparent, must be considered as offsets to the claims of
lost economies. Only the balance, though it may be inexpressible in money
terms . . . can form the basis of decision."'" Thus, the Commission theo-
rizes that separation of such systems will result in certain benefits to both
the gas and electric utility operating companies as separate systems.
Placed in the context of the historical, legislative and judicial history
of the statute, the court of appeals' decision in the NEES case seems to be
in conflict with the long standing interpretation of section 11(b) (1) (A) and
inconsistent with the basic policy objectives of the act pursued by the Com-
mission. The opinion in the case seems to follow the views stated by the
Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comnen, 1" and the minority opinion
98 Id. at 1269-70.
00 Id. at 1270, citing Philadelphia Co., supra note 49, and General Pub. Util, Corp.,
32 S.E.C. 807, 837 (1951).
100 See North American Co., supra note 63.
101 See Engineers Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 51.
102 See Cities Service Co., 15 S.E.C. 962 (1944).
103 See Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, supra note 68, at 940.
104 North American Co., 18 S.E.C. 611, 615 (1945).
105 Louisiana Pub, Serv. Comm'n v. SEC, supra note 72.
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presented in Engineers Pub. Serv.'" "Only in very exceptional circumstances
has the Commission granted approval . .. of the retention of an additional
system."'" Though, as the court correctly points out, 108 there has been no
formal administrative policy enunciated on the retention by a holding com-
pany of an integrated gas utility system in addition to the principal inte-
grated electric system, the Commission has never permitted the retention of
such a system in practice because of their strict interpretation of clause (A)
of the act. "Far from proving to be the 'death sentence' . .. the § 11 pro-
gram has given a new lease on life to private power under public control.
More often than not the liquidation of holding companies has resulted in in-
creasing the market value of the aggregate security interests affected.. . .'no 9
The Supreme Court has granted the SEC's petition for certiorarill° and
their decision should clarify the somewhat diverse opinions on section
11(b)(1)(A).
MRS. CRYSTAL J. LLOYD
106 Engineers Pub. Serv. Co. v. SEC, supra note 68.
107 Ritchie, Integration of Public Utility Holding Companies 191 (1954).
108
 New England Elec. Sys. v. SEC, supra note 42, at 409.
lea Loss, Securities Regulation 141 (1961). A statement giving interpretation to
legislative policy seems particularly pertinent here:
Before the House Committee, Dr. David Friday, the economist for the utility
interests, testified that with companies the size of 'Detroit Edison, Common-
wealth Edison of Chicago, and Southern Edison of Los Angeles, "The holding
companies are not necessary at all." According to this testimony, supercredit
and supermanagement of a holding company are not needed for companies in
large cities. . . , Title I encourages the building up and strengthening of com-
pact systems of related operating units even to the extent of providing exemp-
tion for a holding company if it is necessary for the functioning of such a system.
Sound operating units or regionally integrated systems, not the giant holding
companies, provide the real and only enduring basis of credit for the utility
industry.
Ile SEC v. New England Elec. Sys., 382 U.S. 953 (1965).
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